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SUMMARY
The 107thCongress is expected to address
a broad range of civilian, military, and com-
mercial space issues.
The National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) conducts the most
visible space activities.  NASA’s International
Space Station (ISS) program is the most
controversial because it is over budget, behind
schedule, and relies on Russia for some
hardware and services.  Nevertheless, it has
survived 22 termination attempts in NASA
funding bills since 1991. Other NASA issues
are whether NASA is adequately managing its
flight programs, ensuring the safe operation of
the space shuttle, developing new launch
vehicles, and facilitating space commercializa-
tion. NASA requested $14.04 billion for
FY2001 and Congress approved $14.29 bil-
lion.
The Department of Defense (DOD) has a
less visible but equally substantial space pro-
gram.  Tracking the DOD space budget is
extremely difficult since space is not identified
as a separate line item in the budget.  DOD
sometimes releases only partial information
(omitting funding for classified programs) or
will suddenly release without explanation new
figures for prior years that are quite different
from what was previously reported. The most
recent figures from DOD show a total (classi-
fied and unclassified) FY2000 space budget of
$13.245 billion, with a FY2001 request of
$14.451 billion.  Final figures for FY2001 are
not yet available.  DOD space issues include
management of a program (SBIRS) to develop
new early warning satellites, development of
space control capabilities, and management of
military and intelligence space activities gener-
ally.
The appropriate role of the government in
facilitating commercial space businesses is an
ongoing debate.  For many years, the focus has
been on commercial space launch services, but
commercial remote sensing satellites also pose
complex questions.
Space launch vehicles are similar to
ballistic missiles and concerns exist about the
potential transfer of certain space technologies
to countries intending to build missiles as well.
U.S. linkage between space cooperation and
adherence to the Missile Technology Control
Regime was a significant factor in reaching
agreement on cooperative and commercial
space activities with Russia, and creates a
complex relationship with China.
International cooperation and competi-
tion in space are affected by the world eco-
nomic situation and the post-Cold War politi-
cal climate. President Clinton’s 1993 decision
to merge NASA’s space station program with





Donald Rumsfeld was confirmed as Secretary of Defense (SecDef) on January 20.   In
2000, he chaired the congressionally-created Commission to Assess U.S. National Security
Space Management and Organization, which released its report on January 11, 2001.  The
report’s recommendations are expected to be of even greater interest now that Mr. Rumsfeld
is serving as SecDef.  Its overarching conclusions are that “It is in the U.S. national interest
to: promote the peaceful use of space; use the nation’s potential in space to support its
domestic, economic, diplomatic, and national security objectives; and  develop and deploy
the means to deter and defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against
the uses of space hostile to U.S. interests.” 
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S. Government Civilian Space Programs
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)
The establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-568, the “NASA Act”), symbolized the
entrance of the United States into the space age.  The Soviet Union had successfully orbited
the first artificial satellite, Sputnik 1, on October 4, 1957, lending the U.S. space program a
new urgency.  The first U.S. satellite, Explorer 1 (developed and launched by the Army), was
orbited on January 31, 1958 after several failures of the Naval Research Laboratory’s
Vanguard rocket.  President Eisenhower’s desire to separate military and civilian space
activities led to the “NASA Act” and the creation of the civilian NASA on October 1, 1958,
with the Department of Defense (DOD) retaining control over military space programs.
Human Spaceflight.  The Soviets achieved another space “first” on April 12, 1961,
when Yuri Gagarin became the first human to orbit Earth. The United States responded by
launching Alan Shepard into space on May 5 (though he made only a suborbital flight; the
first American to orbit the earth was John Glenn in February 1962).  Following Shepard’s
flight, President Kennedy announced that the United States intended to put a man on the
Moon within a decade, a goal accomplished on July 20, 1969 when Neil Armstrong and Buzz
Aldrin walked on the Moon (a total of six 2-man crews walked on the Moon through 1972).
Apollo was followed by the Skylab space station (to which 3 crews were sent in 1973-1974)
and the 1975 Apollo-Soyuz Test Project in which a U.S. Apollo spacecraft with 3 astronauts
and a Soviet Soyuz spacecraft with 2 cosmonauts docked for 2 days of joint experiments.
In 1972, President Nixon approved NASA’s space shuttle program to develop a reusable
spacecraft for taking crews and cargo into Earth orbit.  The first shuttle flight occurred in
1981 and the system was declared operational in 1982.  The Challenger tragedy in January
1986 suspended shuttle operations for 32 months, but all the missions since the shuttle
returned to flight in 1988 have been successful.  NASA remains concerned about shuttle
safety, however, and in the FY2001 budget request is asking for funds to hire more people
at the NASA centers that work on the shuttle program (see CRS Issue Brief 93062).
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In 1984, President Reagan directed NASA to build a permanently occupied space station
“within a decade.”  In 1988, Europe, Canada and Japan agreed to be partners with the United
States in building the space station.  Redesigned and rescheduled repeatedly, President
Clinton called for yet another redesign in 1993 and later that year merged NASA’s space
station program with Russia’s.  That program, the International Space Station (ISS), is
currently being built.   The first two segments, paid for by NASA, were launched at the end
of 1998; the third segment, paid for by Russia, was launched in July 2000, more than 2 years
late.  More than 40 U.S. and Russian launches are needed to take segments into space for
assembly and additional flights are needed to take crews and supplies to ISS.  The first ISS
crew (two Russians, one American) took up residency on November 2, 2000.  A replacement
crew is expected to be launched in April 2001.  Questions about Russia’s financial ability to
fulfill its continuing obligations to the ISS program and substantial cost overruns on NASA’s
part of the program make ISS an issue of continuing controversy.  Twenty-two attempts since
1991 to terminate the program in NASA funding bills and three attempts in broader legislation
have failed (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).
Space Science and Applications.  NASA has launched many spacecraft for space
science and applications.  Robotic probes served as pathfinders to the Moon for astronauts,
and have visited all the planets in the solar system except Pluto.  Many space science
spacecraft are now in development or operating.  As discussed further under the section on
“Current NASA Issues”, in 1999, NASA lost two Mars missions, one of which involved
three separate spacecraft, so a total of four spacecraft were lost.  First was the Mars Climate
Orbiter (MCO) that failed in September 1999 because NASA used metric units while its
contractor, Lockheed Martin, used English units for calculating and sending navigation
commands to MCO.  Consequently, the probe was off course as it attempted to go into Mars’
orbit.   MCO carried replacement instruments to compensate for another failed NASA probe,
Mars Observer, with which NASA had lost contact just before it reached Mars in 1993.
MCO’s sister spacecraft, Mars Polar Lander (MPL), and two “Deep Space 2" probes carried
with it were lost in December 1999.  An investigation team could not determine for certain
what caused the December failures, but believes that MPL was lost due to a software design
problem.  MCO and MPL were carried as a single line item in the NASA budget with a total
cost of $328.5 million.  MCO and MPL were part of NASA’s Mars Surveyor program in
which two spacecraft were to be sent to Mars every 26 months (when Earth and Mars are
aligned properly).  They reflected NASA’s “faster, better, cheaper” (FBC) approach to
scientific spacecraft, replacing large, complex spacecraft that can acquire more information,
but take longer and cost more to build.    The last two of that type are Galileo, which arrived
at Jupiter in 1995 and continues to return data, and Cassini, now enroute to Saturn.  The FBC
approach was subsequently scrutinized and NASA restructured its Mars exploration program
significantly.  Instead of launching orbiter-lander pairs in 2001 and 2003 and a sample-return
mission in 2005, NASA will launch one orbiter in 2001, twin landers in 2003, another orbiter
in 2005, and additional spacecraft through the remainder of the decade, with a sample-return
mission in the first half of the next decade.
Earth-orbiting observatories have studied the universe since the 1960s, creating new
fields of astronomy since space-borne telescopes can intercept wavelengths (such as x-rays
and gamma rays) that cannot penetrate Earth’s atmosphere.  In the 1980s, NASA embarked
upon building four “Great Observatories” for studies in different parts of the electromagnetic
spectrum.  Three have been launched: Hubble Space Telescope, launched April 1990 (for the
visible wavelengths); Compton Gamma Ray Observatory, launched April 1991, deorbited
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June 2000; and Chandra X-Ray Observatory, launched July 1999.  The fourth, Space Infrared
Telescope Facility (SIRTF), was reduced in size because of budgetary issues, but NASA still
calls it a “great observatory.” SIRTF is scheduled for launch in 2001.
The 1960s witnessed the development of communications and meteorological satellites
by NASA, and in the 1970s, land and ocean remote sensing satellites.  NASA’s role in this
aspect of space utilization, called space applications, traditionally is R&D, not operations.
Once the technology is proven, operational responsibility is transferred to other government
agencies or the private sector. NASA continues to perform research in many of these areas,
and the Landsat land remote sensing program was returned to NASA after a decade of trying
to privatize it. NASA’s major environmental satellite research program today is the Earth
Observing System (see Environment).
Other Civilian Government Agencies
Beginning in the 1960s, other agencies became involved in space.  At that time,
operation of weather satellites was transferred to what is now the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) in the Department of Commerce.  The Landsat land
remote sensing satellite system was transferred to NOAA in 1979.  (Later, NOAA oversaw
private sector operation of the system, but in 1992, Congress moved the program back into
the government; see below).  The Department of Commerce also is involved in space issues
due to its role in trade policy and export of items on the Commerce Control List, and has an
Office of Space Commercialization mandated to facilitate commercial space businesses.  In
1983, the Department of Transportation (DOT) was given responsibility for facilitating and
regulating commercial launch services companies.  This function is performed through the
Federal Aviation Administration.  DOT and DOD co-chair a group that oversees use of
DOD’s Global Positioning System of navigation satellites.  DOT represents civilian users and
has programs to augment the system’s utility to the civilian community.  Other government
agencies involved in space include the Department of Energy, which historically has
developed nuclear power sources for satellites; the Departments of Agriculture and Interior
(particularly the U.S. Geological Survey) that use satellite data for crop forecasting and map
making, for example; and the Department of State, which develops international space policy
and determines whether to grant export licenses for items on the Munitions List (including
some types of spacecraft and launch vehicles).  The Office of the U.S. Trade Representative,
the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the National Security Council, and other White
House offices also are involved.  President Clinton released a comprehensive space policy on
September 19, 1996, covering all government space activities including those in support of
commercial objectives.
Commercial Space Programs
Civilian communications satellites have been chiefly a private sector activity since
passage of the 1962 Communications Satellite Act (P.L. 87-624). Attempts to commercialize
other aspects of space activities have yielded mixed success.   Congress has passed several
laws to facilitate the commercialization of space launch services for putting satellites into orbit
(the 1984 Commercial Space Launch Act, the 1988 Commercial Space Launch Act
Amendments, the 1990 Launch Services Purchase Act, and  the 1998 Commercial Space
Act).  The development of a U.S. commercial  launch services industry has been largely
successful.  DOD and NASA continue to play a strong role in developing new launch
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vehicles, though private companies also are developing their own.  The most controversial
issues are the relative roles of the government versus the private sector in developing new
systems, ensuring that U.S. companies can compete with foreign launch services companies,
and trade and missile proliferation issues involved in exporting satellites to other countries for
launch. These issues are discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93062.
Congress also sought to facilitate commercialization of land remote sensing satellites by
privatizing the government’s Landsat program through the 1984 Land Remote Sensing
Commercialization Act ( P.L. 98-365).   Such satellites provide imagery of the Earth that can
be used for land-use planning, environmental studies, mineral exploration, and many other
uses. After a tumultuous 8 years that saw the effort to privatize Landsat fail, Congress
repealed that Act and replaced it with the Land Remote Sensing Policy Act of 1992 (P.L.
102-555), bringing Landsat back under government sponsorship.  The Act also promoted
development of new systems by the private sector.  Coupled with a 1994 Clinton
Administration policy, these actions led several U.S. companies to initiate programs to build
remote sensing satellites and offer imagery on a commercial basis. Those companies must
obtain an operating license from  NOAA for such systems.  (The first successful launch of a
commercial imaging satellite, Space Imaging’s Ikonos 2, was achieved in September 1999.
It provides 1-meter data.) 
Controversy over the fact that the imagery has military as well as civilian uses continues
to complicate this commercial space effort, however.   Though not as precise as military
reconnaissance satellites, some of the private sector systems under development can produce
imagery with 1 meter resolution (the ability to “see” an object or feature of a certain size) and
a U.S. company (Space Imaging) has been given permission to build a satellite with half-meter
resolution.   Competitors to U.S. commercial satellite imaging companies include French,
Russian,  Indian, and Israeli companies that offer imagery with 10-meter, 2-meter, 6-meter,
and 1-meter resolution respectively.  Tensions between the U.S. government and the private
sector in implementing the 1994 Clinton policy to ensure that national security is not harmed
by commercial imagery sales prompted an interagency review.   One major issue is when the
government can exercise  “shutter control,” forcing companies to discontinue obtaining or
distributing imagery of certain parts of the world in times of crisis. Shutter control is part of
the 1994 policy, but the companies want greater guidance on when it could be exercised.
Another issue is the government’s role in controlling to whom the imagery is sold and which
countries may invest in the U.S.-owned systems.  U.S. companies want time limits on how
long the government can take to decide whether particular sales or investments will be
permitted so they can make wise business decisions.  Under the 1992 Landsat Act, the
Commerce Department has 120 days to accept or reject license applications.  However,
Clinton Administration policy requires that it consult with other agencies, including the
Departments of State and Defense.  There are no time limits for those departments.
Special issues have arisen regarding Israel.  On October 7, 1994, Senator Bingaman and
63 other Senators sent a letter to the Secretary of Commerce expressing concern that data
from Eyeglass (one of the U.S. systems, built by Orbital Sciences Corporation and
subsequently renamed Orbview) that could be used against Israel would be made available to
Saudi Arabia, which is providing partial financing for the system and would be the location
of a ground station.  Eyeglass officials subsequently agreed not to take images of Israel, but
the issue of access to high quality data is still controversial.  The FY1997 DOD authorization
bill (P.L. 104-201) included language prohibiting the collection and release, or U.S.
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government declassification, of satellite imagery of Israel unless such imagery is no more
detailed or precise than what is available from commercial sources. 
Potential availability of commercial imagery also has a positive side for the military, since
the U.S. military and intelligence communities could reduce costs by acquiring imagery
commercially instead of building their own systems for some purposes.  The House and
Senate Intelligence Committees have strongly encouraged the National Imagery and Mapping
Agency (NIMA) to purchase commercial imagery to augment classified imagery. NIMA has
announced several contracts with commercial imagery providers.  The January 2001 report
of the Independent Commission on NIMA (discussed further under Military Space Issues)
strongly endorsed NIMA acquisition of commercial imagery, and supported the proposal to
allow private sector companies to build satellites with half-meter resolution.  
Other potential commercial space activities are microgravity materials processing
(making products such as purer pharmaceuticals by utilizing the microgravity conditions in
space), space tourism, and space facilities such as Spacehab’s modules that fly inside the
space shuttle’s cargo bay for scientific experiments or carrying cargo.
Military Space Programs
The creation of NASA was a deliberate step by President Eisenhower to separate
military and civilian space activities.  Among other things, he wanted to stress that the United
States was interested in the peaceful uses of space, but recognized that space had military
applications as well.  The 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act specified that military
space activities be conducted by the Department of Defense (DOD).  The Air Force is DOD’s
executive agent for most space programs.  The intelligence community (coordinated by the
Director of Central Intelligence) makes significant use of space-based intelligence collection
capabilities, and participates in managing satellite reconnaissance programs through the
National Reconnaissance Office (NRO), an agency within DOD.  NRO builds and operates
intelligence collection satellites, and collects and processes the resulting data.  The data are
provided to users such as the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and
Mapping Agency (NIMA).  
How to organize DOD and the intelligence community to work effectively on space
matters has been an issue for several years.  Congress established commissions to review the
NRO as part of the FY2000 intelligence authorization act (P.L. 106-120), and the U.S.
National Security Space Management and Organization (the “Rumsfeld Commission” or the
“Space Commission”)  in the FY2000 DOD authorization act (P.L. 106-65).  A commission
was also created to review NIMA.  According to that commission’s report, it was created by
language in the classified annex to the FY2000 DOD appropriations conference report.  The
reports of these commissions are discussed below under “Military Space Issues.”
DOD and the intelligence community rely increasingly on satellites for reconnaissance,
surveillance, early warning, weather forecasts, navigation, and communications.  During the
Persian Gulf War, space-based sensors furnished commanders and staff at all levels with
detailed information, often in near real-time, and satellites were crucial for communications
between the National Command Authority in the United States and Central Command in the
Persian Gulf, and within Central Command.  GPS navigation satellites helped U.S. and allied
land, sea, and air forces pinpoint their own locations as well as enemy targets.  Support from
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space displayed great improvement over what was available during the last major conflict,
Vietnam.  Hence, the Persian Gulf War is dubbed by some the first “space war.”
The separation between military and civilian space programs remains, but the functions
performed by satellites and the vehicles that launch them are not easily divided.  Both sectors
use communications, navigation, weather, and remote sensing/reconnaissance satellites, which
may operate at different frequencies or have different capabilities, but have similar technology.
The same launch vehicles can be used to launch any type of military, civilian, or commercial
satellite.  DOD uses some civilian satellites and vice verse.
DOD develops space launch vehicles, too.  The Delta, Atlas, and Titan launch vehicles
were all initially developed by DOD, while NASA developed Scout and Saturn (both no
longer produced), and the space shuttle. All except the shuttle are “expendable launch
vehicles” (ELVs) that can only be used once (the shuttle is reusable).  An August 1994 White
House policy gave DOD responsibility for maintaining and upgrading the ELV fleet (through
the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle program), while NASA maintains the shuttle and
develops new reusable technology (see CRS Issue Brief IB93062).
After the Cold War ended, DOD and congressional interest in space weapons, both those
to attack other satellites (antisatellite, or ASAT, weapons) and weapons based in space to
attack ballistic missiles, declined initially, but since the 104th Congress, funding has been
added for these projects (see below).  Using satellites to attack ballistic missiles has been
controversial since President Reagan’s 1983 announcement that he would initiate a Strategic
Defense Initiative to study the viability of building a ballistic missile defense (BMD) system
to protect the United States and its allies.  In May 1993, DOD changed the name of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
(BMDO)reflecting decreased emphasis on “national missile defense” (NMD) to defend against
a Soviet attack and increased interest in “theater missile defense” (TMD) for regional
conflicts.  In recent years, however, a renewed commitment to NMD has been made (see CRS
Issue Brief IB10034). Whether BMD weapons ultimately are based in space or on the ground,
a BMD system undoubtedly would require satellites for early warning, communications, and
other traditional support functions served by spacecraft.
Interagency Coordination
Several different mechanisms have been tried since 1958 to coordinate interagency space
policy.  Dissatisfied with the Reagan Administration’s approach of using a Senior Interagency
Group (SIG/Space) under the National Security Council, in the FY1989 NASA authorization
act (P.L. 100-685) Congress re-created the National Space Council.  The original council,
which included aeronautics, was created in the 1958 Space Act but was abolished by
President Nixon in 1973.  The FY1989 law required the council to be chaired by the Vice
President, but did not stipulate what agencies were members.  President Clinton decided to
merge the Space Council functions into a National Science and Technology Council,
administered through the Office of Science and Technology Policy.  It oversees civil and
commercial space policy; military space activities are overseen by the National Security
Council.  The Space Council still exists in law, but it is not staffed or funded.
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International Cooperation and Competition
Virtually every country in the world uses satellites for communications and obtaining
weather data, but the usual measure of whether a country is a member of the “space-faring”
club is its ability to launch satellites.  By this criterion, seven countries (Russia, the United
States, China, Japan, India, Israel, and Ukraine) and the European Space Agency (ESA) are
members.  These countries, including many of the individual members of ESA, present
opportunities for cooperation in space, as well as competition.  The 15 members of ESA are
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.  (North Korea
claims to have successfully launched a satellite in August 1998.  The United States concluded
it was a failed satellite launch attempt.  Others think it was a ballistic missile test.)
The NASA Act specifically states that NASA will conduct international space activities,
and most NASA space programs today have an international component. One of the major
cooperative projects today is the space station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).  European
countries, both individually and through ESA, Canada, and Japan have participated in many
cooperative space programs with NASA.  Most of these countries also compete with U.S.
companies in space activities.  As noted earlier, one area of current concern is competition
in launch services for placing satellites into orbit.  Other competitors include France, Russia,
and India in remote sensing, Europe in communications satellite technology, and Europe and
Japan in microgravity materials processing research.
Cooperation and competition between the United States and the former Soviet Union
attracted much attention.  A joint commission on economic and technological cooperation,
headed by Vice President Gore and the Russian prime minister, was created in 1993 and
meets semi-annually.  Competition with the Soviet Union was measured less in economic
terms than in prestige and national defense.  The prestige competition may finally have ebbed,
and the reduction in military tensions has muted concerns about military satellites.  Thus, the
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Does not include Transition  Quarter.  See text for other notes.
NASA and DOD Space Budgets
The majority of U.S.
government space funding goes to
NASA and DOD.   The
accompanying table shows NASA
and DOD space funding, but must be
used cautiously. Tracking the DOD
space budget is difficult since space
is not specifically identified as a line
item in the DOD budget.  OMB and
GAO provided CRS with DOD
space funding figures through
FY1995 including funding for both
unclassified and classified DOD
space  programs. However, in 1996,
the Director of Central Intelligence
decided for the first time to classify
the NRO funding figure so total figures for DOD space spending were not available for more
than a year.  In the summer of 1997, the Administration finally released a number for the total
DOD FY1996 space budget, $11.5 billion, but at the same time revised numbers downward
for FY1992-1995 without explanation. This table shows the data as provided in the FY1997
Aeronautics and Space Report of the President (published in 1998), with additional data from
DOD for its total space budget for FY1996 through FY2000 and projections through
FY2005.   NASA received $13.6 billion for FY2000 and $14.3 billion for FY2001.  NASA’s
out-year projections as shown in the chart are from the FY2001 budget request.  All NASA
figures include aeronautics funding, approximately $1-1.3 billion a year in recent years. 
Space Program Issues
NASA Issues
NASA has faced many challenges in recent years.  During the early 1990s, high profile
problems (a 5-month delay in shuttle launches because of hydrogen leaks, the Hubble Space
Telescope originally not performing as planned, and the loss of the Mars Observer spacecraft)
created a perception that the agency was not managing programs adequately.  During the
mid-1990s, NASA repaired its image, and even though in 1999 NASA began encountering
problems similar to those in the early 1990s, as well as delays in the space station program
and significant problems with developing new launch vehicles, it escaped the intense
unfavorable media scrutiny of earlier years although Congress focused on some of the
problems.  In particular,  the loss of the two Mars missions, MCO and MPL, discussed earlier
sparked congressional interest as well as internal NASA studies.
The 1999 Mars failures raised concerns in general about NASA’s “faster, better,
cheaper” (FBC) approach to building spacecraft. Three reports requested by NASA were
released in March 2000 that looked at the Mars failures and/or at the FBC paradigm in
general. Colloquially they are called the Stephenson Report, the Spear Report, and the Young
Report and are available at [http://www.nasa.gov/newsinfo/publicreports.html].  A fourth
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report was prepared by the National Research Council at the request of Congress prior to the
Mars failures (Assessment of Mission Size Trade-Offs for Earth and Space Science Missions).
The reports generally founds flaws in the implementation of FBC but none suggested
abandoning FBC.  The Senate Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Science,
Technology, and Space held a hearing on March 22, 2000 on management problems at NASA
where these and other issues were discussed. The House Science Committee’s Subcommittee
on Space and Aeronautics held hearings on the Young Report on April 12 and June 20, 2000.
NASA released a new, more modest approach to Mars exploration in November 2000 that
it hopes will lead to greater success.  Fewer spacecraft will be launched during the first half
of this decade, the timetable for returning a sample of Mars to Earth has been stretched from
2005 to early in the next decade, and more money will be spent to rectify problems identified
in the failure studies of MCO and MPL.
Military Space Issues
The Rumsfeld Commission.    For many years, Congress has expressed concern
about how DOD is organized to manage space activities.  Several management arrangements
have been tried, but concerns remained about how to most effectively organize the military
and intelligence communities to manage space activities.  As noted earlier, Congress created
three commissions in FY2000 funding bills to look at NRO, NIMA, and the overall
management of national security space programs.  The reports of the NRO and NIMA
commissions are discussed below.   The Commission to Assess U.S. National Security Space
Management and Organization—called either the “Space Commission” or the “Rumsfeld
Commission” after its chairman, Donald Rumsfeld, confirmed on January 20 as President
Bush’s Secretary of Defense—released its report on January 11, 2001.  
The Commission concluded that “It is in the U.S. national interest to: promote the
peaceful use of space; use the nation’s potential in space to support its domestic, economic,
diplomatic, and national security objectives; and  develop and deploy the means to deter and
defend against hostile acts directed at U.S. space assets and against the uses of space hostile
to U.S. interests.” (Executive Summary, p. 7) One of the catalysts for creating the
Commission was concern on the part of some Members of Congress that DOD is not
adequately organized to effectively manage and promote space activities.  One question in
particular was whether a Space Force should be created as a separate service, joining the
Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Commission concluded that “National security space
organization and management today fail to reflect the growing importance of space to U.S.
interests” and a “new and more comprehensive approach is needed...” ( p. 29, 30)   While the
Commission did not recommend creation of a Space Force, it did recommend that a position
of Under Secretary of Defense for Space, Intelligence, and Information be established and that
changes be made to how leaders of the U.S. Space Command (a unified command) are
chosen.   To date, the Commander-in-Chief of U.S. Space Command has always been an Air
Force General.  The Commission concluded that “an officer from any Service with an
understanding of combat and space could be assigned to this position.” (p. 33)  The
commissioners also stressed the need for presidential leadership in national security space
matters and suggested creation of a Presidential Space Advisory Group, as well as a Senior
Interagency Group for Space within the National Security Council.  It also recommended that
the “Secretary of Defense and Director of Central Intelligence meet regularly to address
national security space policy, objectives and issues.” (p. 32) Among the Commission’s other
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recommendations is for “an early review and, as appropriate, revision of the national space
policy.”
Early Warning Satellites: the SBIRS Program.  Congress has been quite
supportive of DOD space programs since the mid 1990s.  The DOD space budget is difficult
to track, as noted already, but the major DOD space programs have been supported.  Among
them is a new early warning satellite system, the Space Based Infrared System (SBIRS). 
Existing satellites in the Defense Support Program (DSP) series are primarily designed to
detect intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) rather than shorter-range missiles, such as
the Scud used by Iraq.  After two failed attempts to initiate new early warning satellite
programs, SBIRS was proposed and approved in the FY1996 DOD budget.  It comprises
satellites in both high orbits (“SBIRS-High”) and low orbits (“SBIRS-Low”), unlike DSP
which only uses the “high” orbit.  Congress added money to accelerate the development of
SBIRS in FY1996, FY1997, and FY1999.  
Following a review that addressed technical, cost, and schedule issues in the program,
however, DOD restructured both SBIRS-High and SBIRS-Low in the FY2000 request.  The
first launch of SBIRS-High was delayed from 2002 to 2004 and the first launch of SBIRS-
Low from 2004 to 2006.  Two demonstration projects for SBIRS-Low were canceled.  The
FY2000 request was $328.6 million for SBIRS-High and $229 million for SBIRS-Low.  The
House Intelligence Committee, and House and Senate Armed Services Committees all
expressed concerns in their reports on intelligence and DOD funding bills about how the
program was being managed. For SBIRS-Low, conferees on the FY2000 DOD authorization
bill designated the primary purpose of the program as ballistic missile defense and made other
program management changes, including consolidating SBIRS-Low funding.  The FY2000
DOD appropriations act also consolidated the SBIRS-Low funding, and for SBIRS-High,
added $92 million to the $328.7 million requested but placed constraints on obligating more
than $100 million.  For FY2001, DOD requested $569 million for SBIRS-High and $241
million for SBIRS-Low. The FY2001 DOD authorization act (P.L. 106-398) and the FY2001
DOD appropriations act (P. L. 106-259) approve the requested funding levels.  The
authorization act directs that management of SBIRS-Low shift from the Air Force to BMDO,
as earlier recommended by the Air Force, although the transfer will not occur until FY2002.
Space-Based Weapons, including Antisatellite Weapons.  As noted earlier,
since 1995 Congress has shown renewed interest in space-based weapons to destroy enemy
missiles as part of a National Missile Defense (NMD), as well as in weapons to attack
satellites (antisatellite, or ASAT, systems).  In addition to funding ground-based NMD
programs, Congress added $50 million in FY1996, $70 million in FY1997, $98 million in
FY1998, and $74 million in FY1999 for space based laser (SBL) research and development
in the DOD appropriations bills.  The FY1999 DOD authorization conference report directed
DOD to release promptly a request for proposals (RFP) for a space based laser readiness
demonstrator (SBL-RD).  However, the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board concluded that
technology is not sufficiently advanced to proceed with the SBL-RD, now renamed the
Integrated Flight Experiment (IFX).  The Air Force has restructured  the program so that
instead of choosing a single contractor, a Boeing-Lockheed Martin-TRW team will jointly
develop the IFX, after which a spacecraft contractor will be competitively selected.  For
FY2000, Congress added $10 million to the Air Force’s $63.8 million request for SBL and
approved the $75 million requested for defense-wide RDT&E, for a total of $148.8 million.
For FY2001, DOD requested $63 million for the Air Force program and $75 million for
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defense-wide RDT&E.  The FY2001 DOD authorization act (P.L. 106-398) adds $10 million
to the Air Force level instead of the $30 million added by the Senate, mirroring what was
added in the FY2001 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 106-259).
As for ASAT development, the Clinton Administration terminated a program to develop
a ground-based kinetic-energy ASAT (“KEAsat”) interceptor in 1993, permitting only
technology studies.  Congress revived the program in FY1996, however, adding $30 million
that year, $50 million in FY1997, and $37.5 million in FY1998.  President Clinton line-item
vetoed the $37.5 million on the basis that DOD has other ASAT options and did not need the
KEAsat program.  After the Supreme Court rejected the line-item veto that money was
restored to DOD, and the conference report on the FY1999 DOD authorization bill (H.R.
3616, H.Rept. 105-736) directed DOD to obligate the funds promptly.  However, Congress
apparently was persuaded that there are other methods for achieving the objective of space
control, and stated that DOD could use some of that money for other space control
technologies and added $15 million for space control technologies for FY1999.  For FY2000,
the Administration requested no funding for KEAsat, and $9.8 million for Air Force space
control technologies.  For FY2000, Congress added $7.5 million for KEAsat to the defense-
wide RDT&E budget (none had been requested), and $3 million to the $9.8 million that had
been requested for Air Force space control technology.  For FY2001, Congress approved
$9.7 million requested for Air Force space control technology, and added $3 million for Army
space control technology development (none was requested). The FY2001 DOD
authorization act (P.L. 106-398) specifies that the $3 million is to be allocated to KEAsat.
In a December 5, 2000 letter report (GAO-01-228R) to Senator Smith, GAO stated that the
program was in disarray, and the $7.5 million in FY2000 funding has not been released
because there is no agreement on a spending plan for the program.
Among the alternatives to the KEAsat is a ground-based laser called MIRACL (Mid-
Infrared Advanced Chemical Laser) in New Mexico.  A long-standing congressional
restriction in DOD authorization bills prohibiting the use of MIRACL against targets in space
expired in FY1996.  On October 2, 1997, DOD Secretary William Cohen approved a test use
of MIRACL against an Air Force satellite (MSTI-3).  The test was conducted on October 17,
1997.  DOD insists it was a defensive test designed to assess the satellite’s vulnerability to
laser attack.  Others view it as a test of an offensive antisatellite capability.
NRO and NIMA. Another aspect of national security space activities involves the
NRO. Revelations beginning in September 1995 about poor financial management at NRO
led to a review by a panel chaired by retired Admiral David Jeremiah. The report, released in
April 1997, made 47 recommendations, some of which were adopted while others were
referred for further study.  In response to continuing concerns about NRO’s management, the
FY2000 intelligence authorization act (P.L. 106-120) established a National Commission on
the Review of the National Reconnaissance Office.  That Commission issued its report in
November 2000.  It’s overall finding and conclusion was that NRO requires the personal
attention of the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence
and must remain a strong, separate activity focused on innovation.  The Commission warned
that without such support, significant intelligence failures could result.   NRO’s budget is
classified, but is thought to be on the order of $6-7 billion a year.  
In the late 1990s, recognizing that future budgets could be constrained, NRO adopted
the Future Imagery Architecture (FIA) plan that calls for developing more, smaller, less
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expensive intelligence collection satellites.   Commercial imagery would be purchased to
augment NRO’s own data.  The House and Senate Intelligence Committees expressed
concern in their reports on the original FY2001 intelligence authorization bill (H.R. 4392) that
insufficient funds will be available to NIMA for processing the data into usable products
through NIMA’s “tasking, processing, exploitation, and dissemination” (TPED) activities.
The conference report on that bill (H.Rept. 106-969) does not publicly address TPED,
although Representative Dixon stated during floor debate October 12, 2000 that it is
addressed in the report’s classified annex.  The bill was vetoed for unrelated reasons and a
new version, H.R. 5630, was signed into law December 27 (P.L. 106-567). The conference
report (H.Rept. 106-945) on the FY2001 DOD authorization act (P.L. 106-398) makes
extensive recommendations re TPED and directs the Secretary of Defense, in coordination
with the Director of Central Intelligence, to implement them by February 1, 2001 and submit
a report by that date describing implementation activities.  Congress created a commission
to look at NIMA, including the TPED issue.  According to the Commission’s report, released
in January 2001, it was created by language in the classified annex to the FY2000 DOD
appropriations conference report.  While generally praising NIMA’s work, the report
expressed significant concern with NIMA’s ability to acquire TPED, stating that “heroic
measures will be required to remedy the problems.” (Page xv).
Final House passage of H.R.5630 occurred despite objections to an Allard amendment
adopted by the Senate that deleted a provision requiring NRO to obtain its own launch
vehicles and launches instead of the Air Force doing that for NRO.  Several Members spoke
against the Senate action and asserted they intend to include such a provision in next year’s
bill.  They argue it is a needed reform to improve the management and performance of NRO’s
programs.  There was no debate during Senate consideration of the Allard amendment to
indicate why the provision was deleted, although Congressional Quarterly (Dec. 9, 2000, p.
2819) reported that Senator Allard wanted more time to study the issue.  
The FY2001 DOD appropriations  (P.L. 106-259) and authorization (P.L. 106-398) acts
terminate the Air Force-NRO-Army Discoverer II program that was to involve the launch of
two satellites to demonstrate the ability of radar satellites to track mobile targets on the
ground. Instead, $30 million is provided to NRO to develop and mature technologies for such
a purpose.  Among congressional concerns was whether technology was sufficiently mature;
the potential cost of an operational system of such satellites, which the House Appropriations
Committee estimated at $25 billion; and whether DOD could use all the resulting data. 
   
Developing New Space Launch Vehicles
Government and private sector launch vehicles are discussed in CRS Issue Brief
IB93062.  Briefly, a 1994 Clinton Administration policy directive gave NASA primary
responsibility for maintaining the reusable space shuttle and developing new reusable launch
vehicles (RLVs), while DOD is responsible for expendable launch vehicles (ELVs).  Private
sector companies also are developing new launch vehicles on their own or in partnership with
the government.  U.S. government satellites must be launched on U.S. launch vehicles unless
the President grants a waiver.  Government and commercial customers in the United States
and commercial customers abroad purchase launch services from launch service companies
in the United States, Europe, Russia, China, or Ukraine.
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New launch vehicles are in development both by the government and the private sector.
NASA and Lockheed Martin signed an agreement in 1996 to jointly develop technologies for
a large “single-stage-to-orbit” RLV in a 3-year technology development program called X-33.
Technical challenges have delayed the initiation of test flights from 1999 to 2003 and the
future of the X-33 program is unclear.  NASA was to have decided in 2000 whether to invest
in extensive upgrades to the space shuttle or to rely on the private sector to build a
replacement (a “2nd generation” RLV) based on the X-33 program.  Because of the problems
with the X-33, NASA restructured its program and initiated a new “Space Launch Initiative”
(SLI) in its FY2001 budget through which it plans to fund several companies to develop 2nd
generation RLV technology.  NASA’s five-year plan calls for $4.4 billion to be spent on SLI
starting with $290 million in FY2001.  NASA now plans to decide in 2005 whether to invest
in extensive shuttle upgrades or to anticipate that the private sector will develop a new
vehicle. Meanwhile, NASA plans to spend $1.8 billion over 5 years for “safety and
supportability” upgrades to the space shuttle to ensure its safe operation.  Although the
House zeroed the FY2001 request for SLI in the VA-HUD-IA appropriations bill, the Senate
approved full funding and conferees adopted the Senate position (P.L. 106-391). The request
for shuttle upgrades also was approved.
DOD is pursuing the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program to upgrade
U.S. expendable launch vehicles to reduce launch costs by at least 25%.  Although DOD
originally planned to choose one EELV design, it later decided to fund development of two
based on changing market forecasts in the late 1990s showing increased demand for launch
vehicle services.  Lockheed Martin and Boeing were selected to build the two EELVs (Atlas
5 and Delta 4, respectively).  They and DOD are sharing the development costs.  A downturn
in the market forecast has caused DOD to reassess its EELV procurement strategy, however.
Several private companies also are developing their own launch vehicles.  Legislation
has been introduced to provide loan guarantees or tax incentives to companies attempting to
develop low cost space transportation systems (see CRS Issue Brief IB93062).
Commercial Space and Trade Issues
Commercial space launch issues are discussed in CRS Issue Brief IB93062.  Briefly, the
role of the government in encouraging the growth of commercial space businesses either by
direct or indirect subsidies, or policies that help stave off foreign competitors, continues to
be debated.  Some argue that the government provides indirect subsidies to launch services
companies by allowing them to use government launch sites at nominal costs and providing
a guaranteed market for a certain number of launches.  Others insist that the U.S. government
is doing no more than foreign governments.
The main competitors to U.S. companies today are Europe, China, Russia, and Ukraine.
Most of the satellites that require launches are built in the United States or contain U.S.
components, meaning export licenses are required to ship them to the launch site.  Thus, the
United States has substantial leverage over the success of these competitors in offering launch
services.  Bilateral agreements were signed with China, Russia, and Ukraine setting forth the
conditions under which they offer launch services, both the number of launches and the price
they can charge compared to Western prices (a table comparing these agreements appears in
CRS Issue Brief IB93062).  China’s violations of the Missile Technology Control Regime
(see next section) have long created a vacillating relationship where U.S. sanctions are
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imposed, lifted, and imposed again, and consequently export licenses are granted, suspended,
or reinstated based on the political situation.  Recent concerns that China has acquired
militarily useful technical knowledge by launching U.S.-built satellites has resulted in new
U.S. laws and regulations to ensure such technology or information is not transferred to China
or other countries (see CRS Issue Brief IB93062 and CRS Report RL30231).
The 1996 Clinton space policy calls for a transition from “negotiated trade” in
commercial space launch services to “free and open interaction of market economies” once
the existing commercial launch services agreements with Russia, Ukraine, and China expire.
President Clinton terminated the agreement with Ukraine in June 2000 in recognition of
Ukraine’s commitment to international nonproliferation norms.
As discussed above, another commercial space issue concerns the sale of remote sensing
data with very good resolution. At issue is how to allow U.S. companies to compete in this
market without sacrificing national security interests.
Ballistic Missile Proliferation
Space launch vehicles are close cousins of ballistic missiles, raising concerns about
ensuring that certain space technologies are not exported to countries intending to build
missiles.  A May 1992 agreement between the Russian company Glavkosmos and the Indian
Space Research Organization (ISRO) to sell Russian rocket engines and technology to ISRO
prompted the imposition by the United States of 2-year sanctions against Glavkosmos and
ISRO because the State Department asserted the sale violated the MTCR. To reach
agreement on commercial space launch services and other space cooperation with the United
States, in 1993 Russia agreed to terminate portions of the contract with India regarding the
transfer of technology and know-how (the United States does not object to sale of the engines
per se).  The United States agreed to increase space cooperation with Russia, including
merging the American and Russian space station programs (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017)
and paying Russia $400 million, the same amount of money Russia said it would lose by
restructuring the contract with India. Questions have arisen, however, as to whether Russia
is abiding by the MTCR.  The U.S. government has imposed sanctions against 10 Russian
entities suspected of providing assistance to Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs and
the Iran Nonproliferation Act (P.L. 106-178) prohibits, for example, the transfer of NASA
money to Russia for the space station program unless the President certifies that Russian
companies working on the program have not proliferated to Iran.
Also, export of space products has been used as leverage to get countries to accept U.S.
proliferation policies generally.  For example, President Bush announced in June 1991 that
no U.S.-built satellites would be exported to China for launch until China’s policies regarding
missile proliferation changed.  China agreed to abide by the MTCR and the sanctions were
lifted.  The Clinton Administration charged China with violating the MTCR in August 1993
and imposed sanctions, which were lifted after China again pledged to abide by the MTCR.
International Relationships
The shifting world political situation has allowed new relationships to evolve in
international space cooperation.  Increased cooperation is the result not only of changed
political circumstances, but also of constrained budgets throughout the world.  All the major
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space-faring countries are questioning how much they should invest in space.  The same
budget constraints may preclude the initiation of new programs if a critical mass of funding
is not available.
LEGISLATION
106th Congress, 2nd Session
P.L. 106-259 (H.R. 4576)
FY2001 DOD appropriations act.  Reported from House Appropriations Committee
June 1, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-644); passed House June 7. S. 2593 reported from Senate
Appropriations Committee May 18 (S.Rept. 106-298); incorporated into H.R. 4576 and
passed Senate, amended, June 13.  Conference report (H.Rept. 106-754) filed July 17; passed
House July 19, Senate, July 27.  Signed into law August 9, 2000.
P.L. 106-377, H.R. 4635
FY2001 VA-HUD-IA appropriations act, including NASA.  Reported from House
Appropriations Committee June 12, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-674); passed House June 21.
Reported by Senate Appropriations Committee September 13 (S.Rept. 106-410); passed
Senate October 12.  Conference report (H.Rept. 106-988) passed House and Senate October
19.  Signed into law October 27.
P.L. 106-391, H.R. 1654
FY2000-2002 NASA authorization act.  H.R. 1654 reported from Committee on
Science May 18, 1999 (H.Rept. 106-145); passed House May 19, 1999; passed Senate
November 5, 1999 after substituting the text of  S. 342 (reported from Senate Committee on
Commerce, Science, and Transportation June 16, S.Rept. 106-77), as amended.  Conference
report (H.Rept. 106-843) passed House September 14, 2000; passed Senate October 13.
Signed into law October 30.
P.L. 106-398, H.R. 4205
FY2001 DOD authorization act.  H.R. 4205 reported from House Armed Services
Committee May 12, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-616); passed House May 18, passed Senate July 13
in lieu of  S. 2549, with an amendment.  S. 2549 had been reported from the Senate Armed
Services Committee May 12 (S.Rept. 106-292).  Conference report (H.Rept. 106-945) passed
House October 11, Senate October 12. Signed into law October 30.
P.L. 106-567, H.R. 5630
FY2001 intelligence authorization act.  Introduced and passed by the House November
13, 2000. (Replaces H.R. 4392, which was vetoed November 4.)  Passed Senate, amended,
December 6.  Passed House December 11.  Signed into law December 27.
